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ABSTRACT: Smallsats are inherently more risky ventures than the traditional space mission. Concept, design,
production and integration schedules tend to be much more demanding and the smaller budgets are severely
scrutinized. Quality Assurance and Product Assurance are often targeted to keep the final costs in check.
It is a common misconception that quality is difficult to quantify. Costs are often perceived to be large for
increasingly shrinking benefits. There have been numerous attempts to establish the true cost of quality by simple
breakdowns of process and non-conformance cost and many provide a good estimate of the cost, particularly in
organizations with mature quality systems. The cost/benefit ratio or true value of quality is often in dispute; this
paper will explore the real benefits to a space missions program of an appropriately tailored quality system.
This paper also argues that one of the major keys to the success of a Smallsat program is the management of risk and
the intelligent application of Quality Management principles. As with all engineering projects, normal risk
management principles apply to Smallsat missions: risks must be clearly and comprehensively identified, risk
mitigation strategies must be formulated and the risks must be managed through the life of the project. Prudent use
of Quality Management can be an invaluable tool during the risk management process.
The guiding principal must be to match the quality approach to the requirements; this implies that some
requirements such as reliability and spacecraft life may require the usual rigor associated with normal high
reliability applications. Other areas of the spacecraft design may claim qualification by heritage and possible delta
qualification campaigns.
Reduction of process in Quality Management is the easiest target for project managers but simple reduction must
only be undertaken with an assessment of the risks. Challenging the independent decisions of the Material Review
Board, for example, may save some dollars in the short term but decisions based on quality criteria always endure.
With intense cost and schedule pressures an independent quality voice is essential.
The application of good Quality Management principles also applies to parts selection and there is a tendency to use
Commercial Off The Shelf parts because of their enticing cost savings. An assessment of the true costs, quality and
reliability of the parts has to be made to assess any inherent risks.
With intelligent application, Quality Management can be a powerful and cost effective tool for risk management on
a Smallsat program.
Elaborate processes were developed to trace every
aspect of the design, procurement, manufacturing,
testing, qualification and acceptance of any and all of
the parts and units. Checks and balances were put in
place so that human error was minimised, analysis
techniques developed and implemented to give as much
assurance as possible that the final product was safe for
man to make the journey to our nearest spatial
neighbour. The Russians were to be beaten and nothing
was to fail.

INTRODUCTION
Smallsats And Quality Assurance
In the heady days of the Apollo space program after
President Kennedy challenged the United States and
NASA to go to the moon and return a man safely to
Earth national pride was at stake.1 At the start of the
cold war the space race against the Russians had to be
won at any cost. The technologies were so new and the
space environment so unknown the overriding theme
was that the mission had to succeed. The best and only
way forward was to ensure a Quality approach that
would guarantee the reliability of the equipment.
Cox
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intelligent approach. Throughout the full lifecycle from
specification to acceptance and operation the Quality
Management function can add a tempering of the
project managers enthusiasm to cut budgets and
schedule at the cost of final product quality.

public support once the goal had been achieved by Neil
Armstrong in 1969.
The Shuttle program continued man’s exploration into
space although in low earth orbit.
The Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) doctrine came about,
during the Clinton era when NASA’s administrator,
Dan Goldin was tasked to cut NASA’s budget,
considerably.2,3

RISK
The key to any of this is the management of Risk; so
first lets enter into a discussion of what risk is, and how
it can be managed in a Smallsat program.5

An easy target was Quality Management. When things
were running well Quality was regarded as a huge
overhead with very little payback.

Risk is ‘the potential that something will go wrong as a
result of one or a series of events’.

The small satellite industry adopted the FBC cliché
wholeheartedly; the consequences of mission failure
were, after all, far less catastrophic and less visible to
the public. There were, and are many successes using
the FBC methodology.

It is measured as the combined effect of the probability
of occurrence and the assessed consequence given that
occurrence. The potential for risk becomes increasingly
higher as complexities and new technologies are
introduced in the design of systems. Risk in the context
of Smallsats is the technical risk of not meeting a
requirement or the program risk of not meeting the cost
and schedule constraints.

There were also numerous failures. A “must read”
article by Keith Cowing, written September 15, 2003,
provides sufficient food for thought for all that blindly
pursue the FBC methodology. 4
Faster, Better, Cheaper should be the modus operandi
for all astute managers, after all that is what managers
do. They spend their days optimizing the use of the
ever-decreasing resources in order to produce a final
product that meets the desired specifications.

Risk management is the advanced preparation for future
events designed to minimize the adverse effects and
maximise the positive effects of any event. Risk
management is an iterative process that changes
throughout the life of a program and is an organized
method of identifying and measuring risk and for
selecting and developing options for handling that risk.

What is missing from the Faster, Better, Cheaper
doctrine is one very important constraint, namely, do it
“intelligently”!

In the case of Smallsats the greatest risk is the loss of
the mission and the subsequent loss of reputation and
future business.

In the 80s and 90’s led by the PC revolution and the
insatiable demand for personal entertainment, the
Japanese showed that enormously high volume; high
reliability and highly complex electronics could be
produced at extremely low cost.

Risk management consists of four broad areas:

Identification

In the automotive industry air quality concerns led the
way for microprocessor controlled emission reduction
schemes and electronics were refined that could operate
in the much more demanding thermal and vibration
environments under the hood of a Toyota (or Buick).
Consumer electronics has driven the high tech
revolution so parts and processes are now readily
available. Space technology can now draw on that
experience but it has to be done with intelligence and a
pragmatic approach to the risks involved.

RISK
Control

Planning

Figure 1. Risk Management
It is important to be clear on the identification of risks,
they must be known problems that have a consequence
if they occur, they are not the ‘unknown unknowns’ that
are covered by the usual 15-20% Management Reserve
put aside for such events. The risk events must be
predictable.

In this paper I will attempt to show that Quality
Management whether it be Product Assurance or
Quality Assurance can be a major tool to add to that
Cox
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There is also a distinction made between organizational
risks and project risks, organizational risks cover such
events as legal, insurance, interest and exchange rate
risks and are not within the scope of this paper.

The vehicle for the all of the risk management activities
is the Risk Management Plan, which may be
incorporated in the engineering or management
documentation.

This paper is concerned with the project risks
associated with designing and building of Smallsats and
these include all technical risks, and the risks associated
with subcontractors and suppliers.

Risk assessment and analysis
Once a clear statement of the risks is established the
risk assessment and analysis can begin, the purpose of
this analysis is to identify the causes of the risk, the
effects, the magnitude of the risks and to identify
approaches to the risk response.

It is important that risks are well described so that the
management can be effective. All risks are stated as a
combination of a one Condition and one or more
consequences.

The analysis determines the probability of the
occurrence of event and the consequences of the
occurrence. Table 1 shows a Risk Matrix with Severity
Categories against Frequency of Occurrence.

IF
<CONDITION>

Table 1. Risk Matrix
THEN

<CONSEQUENCE>

Figure 2. Risk Description
For example:
IF <PCB fails life testing>THEN<redesign is necessary
and unit testing will be delayed 15 weeks>

The important rule is to apply the categories
consistently.

Identification is the most crucial and most difficult
stage of the whole management cycle because you are
trying to uncover and predict the future. Risk
management should be started at the proposal stage of
any program.

Many quantitative models exist to determine the Risk
Exposure (RE) but the simplest is
RE = quantitative probability * quantitative impact (in
dollars)

Based on experience the astute manager/engineer can
identify risk areas in each of the proposal, system
requirements, Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), The
Statement of Work (SOW), Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS), supplier and subcontractor relationships, new
technology, process, and internal influences (staff,
management).

On first pass, evaluate RE assuming no mitigation
effort
On second pass, think of likely mitigation strategy and
adjust RE value.
Risk Planning

All members of the team should participate in the
bottoms-up approach and the key is to write thing down
in clear statements and try to go around the review
cycle at least twice as there is always something that is
missed.

The response to a series of risks can be classed as:
Avoid
Transfer
Accept
Mitigate

Key techniques for risk identification include
brainstorming, Software Engineering Institute (SEI)
Taxonomy Based Questionnaire, checklists.6,7
All team members must contribute!
Cox
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The tracking and use of Technical Performance
Measurements (TPM), which are continually monitored
throughout life of the program and critically assessed at
major milestone reviews, such as Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) can
also track and eventually retire risks.

As we will see later in this discussion avoidance is key.

AVOID RISKY DESIGN
For Smallsats the primary area of failure is bad design.
Avoidance of risk is the preferred strategy; this means
in the early stages of a Smallsat venture it may be
possible to challenge the original concept if it
eliminates any significant risk.

Testing and the use of environmental testing early in
the program can mitigate risks. The use of Structural
Qualification Models (SQM), parts testing including
Total Ionising Dose (TID) testing, Particle Impact
Noise Detection (PIND), Destructive Physical Analysis
(DPA) testing, and processes like the Critical Items List
(CIL), can all help to mitigate risks.

Transfer of risk is sometimes possible in a customer
relationship; this strategy often applies to business
rather than technical risks where contractual exclusions
and assumptions can reduce the risk to you. But
ultimately the risk remains!

Risk Control
Risk control meetings should be held monthly and
should be attended by the Quality representative and all
the risk owners. Each risk is reviewed and all risk
attributes (probability, severity, exposure, timeframe,
priority, mitigation, trigger, contingency plan) need to
be reviewed as well as latest mitigation status.

Acceptance of a risk is a third possibility; the
consequences and probabilities may be so insignificant
that the program will just accept them. There are finite
risks associated with a launch and insurance may not
cover the entire cost. The technology may be new or
unproven, qualification inadequate, verification and
validation not up to par. The acceptance of risk is
normally only an option after careful assessment by
independent consultants.

Control actions that can be implemented include:
Risk closure
Continue mitigation
Change mitigation strategy
Execute contingency plan (ouch!)

Are you willing to just cross your fingers and hope it
doesn’t happen?
By far the most acceptable and widely used strategy is
to Mitigate the risks. This means to reduce the
probability and or impact of the threat through active
steps.

And always remember that the risk management
process is iterative so that new risks need to be added as
they arise and old risks retired. The key to risk control
is to move early and decisively on problems and
maintain flexibility in the approach to risks.

Any effective mitigation strategy involves:

SPACECRAFT FAILURES

Clear action(s)
Clear resource estimates
Clear milestones to measure progress
Continuous tracking/data collection for feeding
into the control mechanism i.e. the Risk Status
Report
Clear “triggers” for recognizing risk -> problem
transition
Contingency plan (for dealing with the problem)

Once we have an understanding of what risks are and
how they can be managed we can apply this intelligent
approach to Smallsats. But where do we begin?
“It was almost a 100% success”
Quote from a spokesman from the Italian Space Agency
after their tethered satellite experiment turned 25
kilometres of wire into a mass dummy in the belly of
the shuttle.8

On the technical side there are a number of analysis
tools that can be used to quantify the risks. These
include: Failure analysis including Failure Mode Effect
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Hazard Analysis
and Cause and Effect Analysis. Most of these tools
assess the satellite at its End Of Life (EOL).

Cox

So where do the failures come from? How can there be
any failures at all when traditional spacecraft spend
inordinate amounts of money on S class parts that are
screened, burned in, environmentally tested and then
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The human environment is a danger. Less is heard
about these failures because they are recoverable on the
ground but the costs are still added to the final project
total. The intelligent application of Quality
Management and process can often eliminate these
ground-based risks.

number one failure mechanism. Empirical evidence
suggests there is an 80/20% split between Poor Design
and Human Error.9

Once the spacecraft is complete it has to endure the
severe vibration environment of launch and then the
thermal cycling of on orbit operations. There have been
numerous causes of launch failures associated with
badly misjudged vibration environments in the launcher
and separation systems. 11

20%
80%

POOR DESIGN
Hardware
Software
Misunderstanding
Environment
Parts Application

HUMAN ERROR
Management Decisions
Poor Workmanship

Poor design – Parts Application
We now come to the one area that has the most money
thrown at it over the ages and that is parts. Parts and in
particular mechanical parts are the least likely items to
fail in any space application. When people point to a
part failure a little more analysis normally reveals that
the part was exposed to a condition for which it was not
designed such as an inrush current, over temperature or
radiation dosage that exceeded its limits. In other
words, there was a design problem or environment
problem and not a problem with the part itself.

Figure 3. Spacecraft Failures
Poor Design – Hardware and Software
In 1979 the LEWIS satellite had an inadequate
Guidance Navigation and Control System (GN&C)
which caused the satellite to tumble out of control.
In 1999 the Mars Polar Lander was badly designed so
that it could not with withstand the shock of landing
and the motors shut down.
Also in 1999 the WIRE satellite was lost as a starting
transient caused the telescope covers to prematurely
eject. 10
The list goes on and on and the design failures are not
limited to hardware design. With the increasing use of
complex software there have been many instances of
improperly tested software either locking up or in the
case of the Clementine satellite switching on the
thrusters and not being able to switch them off!

Figure 4. An expensive example of Human Error
Human Error –Management Decisions
The human error slice of the failure pie can be divided
into two portions Management and workmanship.
People decided to launch the shuttle when they knew
the O rings were not designed to operate at low
temperatures, people stood by as numerous instances of
insulating foam broke off the external tanks of the
Challenger, well before the actual disaster. These high
profile examples illustrate deliberate decisions that
ended in disaster.

Poor Design - Misunderstanding the environment
Second on the list is not understanding the environment
that the spacecraft has to endure on its journey through
manufacture, to space and for its allotted life. I
particularly mention the satellites life on the ground
because this is an often-neglected area of risk. Satellites
spend years in pieces, often scattered around the world
before they are finally integrated in a relatively clean
facility. During that long period they are exposed to all
sorts of storage and transportation environments, heat,
humidity and the exposure to humans who no matter
how skilled often make mistakes.
Cox
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they give the customer and insurance underwriters the
confidence they require to fund and insure the satellite
mission. So how can we apply the required intelligence
to reduce the risk and assure the quality and reliability
of the spacecraft?

Human Error – Workmanship
Finally, we come to the workmanship errors such as
bad soldering, poor assembly techniques, bad processes
that contribute to short or long term problems.
Having established the priorities of the failure
mechanisms we can now explore more about the
reliability and how to apply the correct amount of
Quality Management effort to reduce the risks.

The on orbit environment of space is reasonably
benign, getting there is not. The qualification route
proves the spacecraft will survive all of the following:
Vibration levels of launch (including acoustic
vibration),
Shock levels of separation,
Quasi static loading,
Thermal cycling experienced during orbit
Radiation effects on electronics
Outgassing effects from materials,
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)

In the risk discussion we mentioned the need to avoid
risky design and build slowly upon existing, proven
technologies. We will now look at the arguments for
using flight heritage as much as possible.
HERITAGE
One of the cornerstones of a Smallsat approach is to
rely on flight and design heritage to avoid the cost and
time involved in qualification testing. This approach is
sound but must be used with caution.

And possibly mechanical problems like cold welding
and lubrication issues associated with deployable
structures.

Before heritage can be claimed it must be demonstrated
that the design has sufficient margin on all the relevant
technical parameters and over the duration of the
mission. It is rare that two missions environmental
conditions are identical as a simple change in the orbit
characteristics can affect the radiation and thermal
environment significantly.

Not only does the Smallsat have to work in a vacuum
environment, it also has to work in worst-case
conditions, if something goes wrong, and also for the
entire mission duration.
Qualification not only proves the design will work it
gives an assurance of the lifetime and long-term
reliability.

A more stable and workable solution, and one adopted
by most Small sat providers, is to have an evolutionary
approach so that each follow-on satellite builds on the
experiences of the last. Only small incremental changes
are made with each new launch and the differences are
identified at the requirements development stage for
each new project.

A typical approach to qualification for Smallsats would
follow the steps:

This approach has many advantages. Radical and hence
risky departures from a baseline are avoided, small
changes are more manageable from a technical
standpoint and by identifying the small changes early in
the project life cycle they can be identified, tracked and
mitigated in a risk budget.

Avoid qualification it if at all possible. This is not
meant to be a glib statement but if there is a route to a
qualified product without qualification testing it should
be vigorously pursued. Rely on flight and design
heritage wherever possible, exploit previous
experience. Keep the design simple by avoiding any
deployable structures. Use previously qualified
processes and procedures, avoid the new and unknown
and keep new development to a minimum.

If heritage designs do not fulfil the expectations there is
a need to prove the new developments are capable of
meeting the requirements and the designs must be
qualified.

If you have to qualify because previous heritage cannot
match the exact environment then pursue a delta
qualification campaign that will ‘make up the
difference’.

QUALIFICATION

For new development or for any other reason a full
qualification campaign is required consider the
following:

Smallsat providers are faced with a dilemma when it
comes to qualification. Qualification programs are
hugely expensive, time consuming and require
specialist knowledge and facilities. On the positive side
Cox
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allow alternative routes for supply or subcontract to be
taken.

evaluate, monitor and assess the software development
life cycle.

Ensure the qualification campaign addresses both shortterm survival and long-term reliability. There are many
standard accelerated life-testing techniques for both
electrical and mechanical parts that can compress the
expected life of years into months of testing.12

Critical Software
For critical software the complete software
development lifecycle must be under control from the
evaluation of the requirements through to the control of
changes, the focus of effort should follow the
guidelines of a recognized standard such as MIL STD
498 and the principal areas of control should be to:

Always have a contingency plan in the event the testing
fails. If there is a sign of failure on the horizon: act
decisively and act quickly. Good project managers
know things do not get better on their own and you will
get the full support of Quality Management!

Identify Standards and Guidelines
Evaluate Software Tools and facilities
Evaluate Requirements Analysis Process
Evaluate Design Process
Evaluate Code and Unit Testing Process
Evaluate Integration Testing Process
Evaluate Acceptance Testing Process
Evaluate the Corrective Action Process
Evaluate Deviations and Waivers Process
Evaluate Configuration Management Process

When things do go wrong during testing campaigns,
follow the Material Review Board (MRB) process, it is
always shorter and less expensive in the long run and
the outcome will meet the requirements. Let Quality
Management do its job!
Many Smallsat companies try to integrate to a high
level before qualification testing. This can mean units
and sub systems can be all integrated into the spacecraft
before seeing the environmental testing conditions. This
approach is attractive because of expediency but
introduces risk and it is risk late in the integration
program. This should only be tried if there is a high
level of confidence in a design, there are alternatives
and there is little new development.

This will ensure that the customer's requirements are in
agreement with the statement of work of each software
contract.
Non-Critical software
Non-critical functions can use COTS or modified
COTS software and the trend is to use up-loadable
software and actually test and integrate the software on
orbit. This has schedule advantages and offers a great
deal of flexibility to upload and modify and improve
the software on orbit but caution is required. It must be
impossible to modify any boot software resident on the
spacecraft (in non volatile memory) and once again it
must be impossible to damage the spacecraft itself.

As we have seen there have been major failures
associated with poor software design we will now
examine the Quality Management effort given to
Software.
SOFTWARE QA (SQA)
Together with the use of commercial parts in Smallsats
there is an equal desire to use Commercial Off The
Shelf (COTS) software. Similar financial and schedule
enticements are there for the eager project manager.
Most COTS software does not stand up to any of the
usual rigor expected for flight software but once again
it is important to match the quality of the software to
the application.

For any Smallsat program with a significant software
component a Software Management Plan/Software
Development Plan (SMP/SDP) is required to document
a planned and systematic set of activities to ensure
software processes and products conform to
requirements, standards, and procedures.
PARTS SELECTION

During the requirements stage the criticality of the
software function must be assessed, similar criteria to
hardware may be used where any software function that
could cause damage to the spacecraft must be under
maximum scrutiny.

Since the Gemini era when all and any electronic parts
were scarce there was a concerted effort to improve the
quality of spacecraft by developing highly reliable
parts. Space (S) rated parts programs were refined by
the aerospace industry, principally by NASA and the
military, where traceability, testing and screening
programs could assure the finished component would
meet the most exacting demands of the space

The application of special techniques such as the ones
established by the Software Engineering Institute and
other industry "best practices" standards are used to
Cox
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environment. S rated parts are highly reliable and their
production and testing history can be tracked all the
way to the copper mines of Peru but they are also
orders of magnitude more expensive and difficult to get
hold of because of the long lead times. S rated parts
come in low volume, have limited functionality, are
highly reliable (and have proven reliability) but are very
expensive.

Table 2. Severity Categories
Category

Severity Definition

1

Catastrophic failure modes that
could result in loss of the
spacecraft.
Failure modes of redundant
hardware items that, if failed,
could result in category 1 effects.
Failure in safety or hazard
monitoring systems that could lead
to Severity Category 1
consequences.

1R

The seventies and eighties saw commercial forces that
increased the market demand for cheap, high volume
consumer electronics and now in the new millennium
cell phones, PCs and personal entertainment systems
are available at increasingly less cost. So we have
commercial parts with exceedingly high volume, high
functionality, high reliability in a benign environment,
and they are readily available and exceedingly cheap.

1S

2
2R

Now no one is suggesting we gut the Sony Walkman
and launch the contents but it is easy to see the enticing
argument for the use of commercial parts. To temper
the program manager’s enthusiasm who has a limited
budget and time pressures to complete a product a
healthy dose of reality needs to be applied and this is
where Quality Management can add value.
As we have seen parts are important, not as important
as correct design, the environment or assembly, but
they are still important and it would be totally foolhardy
to follow the mantra of commercial parts without
looking at the application, the mission duration and the
environment.

Critical Failure modes that could
result in loss of one or more
mission objectives.
Failure modes of redundant
hardware items that could result in
Category 2 effects.

3

Marginal failure modes that could
cause degradation to mission
objectives

4

Negligible failure modes that
could result in insignificant or no
loss to mission objectives.

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) procedures
should be performed in accordance with documented
procedures. Failure modes resulting in Severity
Categories 1, 1R, 1S, or 2 should be analyzed in greater
depth, to the single parts if necessary, to identify the
cause of the failure.

Critical functions still require the best available parts
and redundancy of application should not be used just
to allow for the unreliability of a series of parts. The
satellite downlink transmitter has to work, it has to
work every time. It has to survive the vibration of
launch, the thermal cycling of every orbit, the radiation
environment, the constant switching on and off and it
has to do it for, typically, 5 years or more.

Results of the FMEA will be used to evaluate the
design relative to the requirements (for example, no
single unit failure to prevent removal of power from the
unit). Identified discrepancies will be evaluated by the
management, Quality and design groups to assess the
need for corrective action.

Assessing the criticality of the various functions of the
spacecraft at the design stage is crucial. An example of
Severity Categories is given in Table 2.

The FMEA will analyze redundancies to ensure that
redundant paths are isolated or protected such that any
single failure that causes the loss of a functional path
will not affect the other functional path(s) or the
capability to switch operation to that redundant path.
All failure modes that are assigned Severity Categories
1, 1R, 1S, and 2 will be itemized on a Critical Items
List (CIL) and submitted with the FMEA report.
Rational for retaining the items will be included on the
CIL.

Cox
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to packaging technologies, metallization technologies,
design rules and margin of safety for electro migration.
Has the life expectancy under de-rated conditions been
assessed?

These analysis techniques are a useful way of applying
the right amount of design effort and enable the astute
program manager to assess and react to the risk.
The analysis will reveal the criticality of the application
within the spacecraft and hence the suitability of a
COTS part can be assessed. The environmental
considerations include:

Has the Thermal cycle durability of lead free solder
joints, especially surface mount technology been
examined?
On the programmatic side. How are design changes
managed, is there process control and what screening, if
any, is applied?

Radiation susceptibility (TID, SEU)
Temperature constraints
Shock
Vibration

How is obsolescence managed, how reliable is the
supply chain?

For reliability the use of parts from NASA or ESA
standard parts lists is the best option.

JPL has stated “Acquisition costs of COTS in high
reliability applications do not reflect total cost of
ownership”. 13

There are a number of more subtle failure modes that
can have a long-term effect on spacecraft reliability.
What are the packaging failure modes for COTS?
Humidity based corrosion and inter metallic failures are
well understood and documented. The failures are time
dependent and latent in nature, and testing may not
reveal either corrosion or purple plaque, until it is too
late.

JPL also quotes numbers of total cost of ownership to
be between 40 – 50 times the costs of the COTS
acquisition, and finally JPL quotes COTS yield as 58%
COTS devices are also constantly reengineered, with a
typical cycle times of 18 months. The main scope of
this fine-tuning is to optimise the design (remove spare
margin, tweak the timing circuitry, additional
functionality). All this is going on without the buyer
being informed of any of the changes that are taking
place. The problem with this is that the original part
may not be available for new hardware, and on top of
this, the new chip (although supposedly better) may not
work in the old design. Needless to say that requalification will be required (including radiation
testing), costing time and money.

If the part is to be used in an optical mission have
outgassing properties been assessed?
It is a fact that the use of COTS parts in “optical”
sensitive areas is troublesome, many contain
indeterminate materials and it is necessary to determine
the outgassing properties of the part by test, and find
appropriate engineering solutions.
COMMERCIAL RELIABILITY AND COST

One obvious solution is to buy sufficient spare parts at
the outset of any new program, the drawback being the
extra cost of buying, storing, and retesting.

Although it is extremely enticing, to choose COTS
parts because of their immediate cost savings, to
understand the true reliability of COTS parts we have to
consider the following:

Be very cautious in the application of COTS parts, the
up front costs rarely reflect the true cost to the program.

The infant mortality region has to be eliminated. COTS
parts are not screened they do not undergo pre-cap
inspections, PIND, X-rays, C SCAN, burn-in, or
environmental testing for the few percent of early
failures.

As well as the intelligent use of parts, the use of process
is often under scrutiny. One process that should not be
compromised in a Smallsat program is the Material
Review Board and the independence of Quality
Management.

Pi Q factors (quality multiplier coefficients for failure
rates) can be hundred of times higher for unscreened
commercial parts compared to screened parts.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF QUALITY
DECISIONS

Steady State (constant) failure rates are higher
compared to military high-reliability parts. This is due

Effective organisations always maintain an independent
assessment of quality. ISO 9000

Cox
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To ensure the success of the MRB there are two
overriding requirements, the independence, as we have
seen, and this means the MRB chair reports to a Quality
manager/ director outside of the project and secondly
the project itself must believe in the process and accept
the decisions with little or no dispute.

requires that quality decisions can only be useful if they
are independent from cost and schedule pressures. 14
While there were many technical failures with the
shuttle Columbia in 2003 one of the strongest
conclusions from the Columbia accident investigation
report was that an erosion of the quality organisation
made real quality decisions impossible.15

There is rarely a case when ‘doing it right’ has not
saved time and money in the long run.

At NASA the Quality organisation was dependant upon
the individual project for funding and the political
pressure to make decisions based on political and
schedule pressures was overwhelming. The ‘Can Do’
culture prevailed and the Quality role was reduced to a
mere signature on the documents. Quality Management
even reported to the project in many cases so the
impetus to ‘do the right thing’ was minimized.

Smallsats are no different and if there is one area of
quality that should not be compromised it is with the
MRB process. Keep the independence, keep the process
and allow the chairman to make the quality decisions
that will, eventually, get the satellite program back on
track.
FROM ANALYSIS TO EMPIRICISM

The report also concluded that the changes in corporate
culture necessary to regain a truly independent status
for Quality Management would be one of the hardest
cultural shifts NASA had to undertake. The results of
the 1986 Challenger disaster investigation uncovered
the same organisational flaws and the problems were
repeated 7 years later.16

Traditional space programs have relied heavily on
analysis of any design. There have been many reasons
for this. Many of the satellites have broken new
technological ground and the customers have demanded
an assurance that the new technology would function.
The risk-averse culture of the space business that was
started with the manned space program has often spilled
over into the non-manned area. Most missions are
complex and all have relatively high budgets, the time
scales are long and the cost of failure high both in
reputation and in dollars. So, naturally, assurance is
required. Next we have insurance, the possibility of
offsetting a potential loss by underwriting some or all
of the cost of a failure during launch and operations.
Second to engineers, the underwriters are probably the
most cautious group when it comes to risk. To get their
assurance they have demanded serious and credible
proof that the satellite will perform.

Now, of course, the failure of a Smallsat does not have
the same grave and tragic consequences as a Shuttle
disaster but no one wants a mission to fail. If safeguards
can be put in place to ensure that the quality of the end
product meets or exceed the requirements for a
successful mission, and the cost is reasonable, it should
be done.
Quality independence is easy to specify and quite easy
to implement in the early phases of the program when
cost and schedule pressures are less noticeable. The real
test comes when there is a failure during flight
acceptance testing and there could be a real impact on
the program.

Add onto this the environmental testing that all
spacecraft are subjected to and you have a body of
knowledge that helps enormously to allay the fears. So
far, so good but what are the disadvantages of analysis.

Traditional methods employ a system of Material
Review Boards (MRBs) chaired by Quality
Management who make decisions based solely on
quality criteria. The Chair collects the technical inputs
and charts a course of failure investigation or corrective
action that will put the hardware back into a flight
worthy state. He does this without the influence of the
project managers who are concerned with cost and
schedule. Quality is the number one concern. The MRB
can only be effective if the chair has the authority and
independence to make the right decisions (A certain
dogged determination and insensitivity is also an
asset!).
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Firstly it is expensive. To properly perform a Failure
analysis, Derating analysis, structural analysis, Worse
case analysis on all the myriad components in a satellite
takes a huge amount of time and effort. It requires
specialist skills, sophisticated software tools and a
considerable amount of time.
Secondly, the outputs are often in doubt. Now I am not
for one moment suggesting the analysis is not
worthwhile but its results often have to be tempered
with a heavy dose of common sense. A FMEA, for
example, based on MIL HDBK 217 often arrives at
overly conservative results. The handbook served its
10
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Quality Management can be a forceful tool to realise
everyone’s dream of easier, affordable access to space,
the key is to apply the principles with intelligence.

purpose nobly when technology was not accelerating at
its current exponential rate but now the reliability
figures just cannot keep up with the technology and
many commercial devices are just not included.

Acronyms
The reliability of the shuttle was analysed, using all the
best methods available, as being capable of 20,000
flights without a fatal accident, it lasted 26.

CDR
CIL
COTS
C SCAN
DPA
EMC
EOL
ESA
FBC
FMEA
FMECA

There are numerous commercial standards available
(Bellcore ETC), which have the reliability data and
methods, but how will our nervous underwriters and
penny-wise customers be assured that the product is not
going to fail?
The suggestion is that analysis can be used in
conjunction with heritage data and a rigorous testing
campaign, in other words the analysis complements the
overall package of data that is required to give the
confidence in the design.

IC
ISO
PA
PC
PCB
PDR
QA
QML/QPL
QM
RE
RFP
MRB
NASA

But what is the reliability of my spacecraft? I hear the
customer cry in amazement. I don’t have a reliability
figure, who can assure me it will last for five years?
And this is where the true paradigm shift of Smallsat
thinking comes into play. You may never be able to
give a firm number. The confidence is built up though
the reliance on a robust design based on functions with
known heritage, a few carefully scrutinised changes, a
sound knowledge of the environment in which the
Spacecraft will operate, a parts program that matches
the quality to the function and more importantly a
testing campaign that will screen out risks at a very
early stage. The traditional analysis has moved from its
pedestal of supremacy to a supporting role, which now
verifies the results of testing

PEMs
PIND
PiQ
RE
SDP/SMP

CONCLUSIONS
SEU
SOW
SQA
SQM
TID
TPM

This paper has argued that the intelligent application of
Quality Management principles to a Smallsat project
can greatly enhance the chances of a successful
mission. The key is to manage risk appropriately, to
carefully identify the risks, analyse them and then adopt
active strategies for their mitigation. By applying the
appropriate amount of process and diligence at the
requirements and design stages, areas that require the
most scrutiny, the project manager can avoid or
eliminate mission reliability or performance issues.
With the selection of appropriate parts and testing
strategies high levels of confidence can be gained in the
reliability of the spacecraft and the insurers will feel
confident in the mission outcomes.
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T & Cs
WBS
WCA
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Critical Design Review
Critical Items List
Commercial Off The Shelf
Ultrasonic, non-invasive inspection
Destructive Physical Analysis
Electromagnetic Compatibility
End Of Life
European Space Agency
Faster Better Cheaper
Failure Mode Effect Analysis
Failure Mode and Effect Criticality
Analysis
Integrated Circuit
International Standards Organization
Product Assurance
Personal Computer
Printed Circuit Board
Preliminary Design Review
Quality Assurance
Qualified Materials/Parts List
Quality Management
Risk Exposure
Request for Proposal
Material Review Board
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Plastic Encapsulated Modules
Particle Impact Noise Detection
Quality factor for parts
Risk Exposure
Software Development Plan/Software
Management Plan
Single Event Upset
Statement of Work
Software Quality Assurance
Structural Qualification Model
Total Ionizing Dose
Technical Performance
Measurements
Terms and Conditions
Work Breakdown Structure
Worst Case Analysis

19th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

SSC05-11-6
References:

Additional Reference Material

1.

http://history.nasa.gov/moondec.html

2.

http://techdigest.jhuapl.edu/td2201/goldin.pdf

Space Missions Analysis and Design, James Wertz &
Wiley Larson, 3rd Edition Microcosm Press/Kluwer
Academic Publishers 1999.

3.

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id
=864

Understanding Space, Jerry Jon Sellers, 2nd Edition
McGraw Hill 2000

4.

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id
=680

Elements of Spacecraft Design, Charles D Brown,
AIAA Education series, 2002

5.

Reference System Engineering Management
Benjamin S Blanchard 2nd Edition John Wiley and
Sons1998)

file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/bcox/Local%
20Settings/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.IE
5/JX7891O3/256,3,Program Risk Management

6.

Boehm’s “top 10” risk list, (Boehm, B. IEEE
Tutorial on Software Risk Management. IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1989.).

Waltzing with Bears: Managing Risk on Software
Projects, Tom DeMarco, Timothy Lister. Dorset House
2003.

7.

“Risk Radar” tool
www.iceincusa.com/products_tools.htm

The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology,
Culture, and Deviance at NASA - Diane Vaughan,
University of Chicago Press, 1997

8.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/
world/italy/tss.htm#ref50)

9.

Texts by McConnell, Gilb, Humphrey, Pfleeger,
Blanchard all have sections on risk management

Logic of Microspace, Rick Fleeter, Microcosm
Press/Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

10. file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/
bcox/Local%20Settings/
Temporary%20Internet%20Files/
Content.IE5/3RKCTCQA/256,1,Slide 1
11. http://www.aviationnow.com/media/pdf/
spec05_launchfailures.pdf
12. http://www.weibull.com/AccelTestWeb/
arrhenius_relationship_introduction.htm
13. http://parts.jpl.nasa.gov/cots/external/ issues_1.pdf
14. http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso900014000/iso9000/iso9000index.html
15. http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/
html/images/images/caib_07.jpg
16. http://www.engineering.com/content/
ContentDisplay?contentId=41009024

Cox

12

19th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

